Tax Regimes that Don’t Invite Corruption
H. William Batt, Ph.D., Board of Directors
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York
International Union for Land Value Taxation, London
International Journal of Transdisciplinary Research
Note: The New York metro area considered is four boroughs of New York City–the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens–and ten counties in northern and central New Jersey. Staten Island, the fifth New York City borough, is excluded because transaction data are unavailable.
The cost of compliance, evasion, and corruption in the collection of taxes is estimated at about 15 percent of GDP in the United States, and is far higher in most nations. This does not include the excess burden and time spent in the administrative process for both payment and collection. Much of the waste is due to poor design, which a better understanding of economics and tax theory could go far to remedy.
A solution lies in the taxation of what classical economists called land rent, ground rent, Ricardian rent, and resource rent. Not only would taxing rents reduce and even eliminate much of the corruption associated with tax administration, it would also better conform to all the textbook principles of sound tax theory. Contrary to common belief, it is the perfect revenue system. Moreover, careful analysis shows that the economic rent as a proportion of GDP is sufficient to finance all government services, easily enough to supplant taxes on labor and capital goods that are far less efficient and rest on weak moral ground. Rent is the yield value above any price necessary to bring a resource into economic play. Its value is created not by individual market players but rather by society cooperatively. All natural resources yield rent to the extent that they are part of the market. Land sites, air, water, the spectrum, time slots, and a host of other elements not created by human hands or minds all yield rent.
An ideal tax is neutral and efficient with respect to markets and progressive in so far as those who have fewer resources will pay less. It is also easily administered, simple to understand, and provides a stable and reliable revenue stream. It is certain in the face of any attempts at evasion. Lastly it is environmentally helpful because it reduces the throughput consumption of natural resources, and when applied to land value, it acts to reverse the centrifugal forces of sprawl development.
The central point is it is difficult to cheat or evade a tax on land: it cannot be hidden or moved away. It is easily rated and levied. And all parties can be witness to its payment.
A MORE STEALTHY GEORGIST CAT (here is an alternative proposal that we should be examining)
The Georgist cat is small and lean
And often doesn’t get to be seen.
It hides in the branches of an economic’s-tree
So it takes a long while for you or for me,
To appreciate its cute and original form
That the landlords are so ready to scorn.
The economic’s-tree has many fine branches
(On which we contend, there are no free-lunches).
Whilst the land-owning rich in the city all claim
As bloated capitalists, that they’re not to blame
For the gap that lays ‘twixt the poor and the wealthy,
But oppose any tax to make our nation healthy.
Have you heard the tale of a committee, that
Thought to bell and get warning of a fat cat?
But could not find a soul to apply this device,
Because typically all were a council of mice!
Our Georgist cat has a bell ready-fitted,
(Which makes this analogy more to be pitted).
This warning sound makes our ideals unwanted,
For a new tax is how politicians get doubted.
So the Georgist cat fails to catch any mice
That pose as landlords, along with their vice.
But how shall we silence the bell’s warning sound
And quieten the news that our pussy’s around?
Our Georgist feline is in serious error,
‘Cause its bell draws attention not only to whether
Valuable sites can be ethically shared,
But also the rent from a site is declared
As the means to replace other kinds of taxation,
Which obviously causes the landlords vexation.
In the economic’s tree many other beasts lurk
But are missed, after learning of Henry G’s quirk
Through the cat-finder’s recently brilliant discovery.
This writer seeks a new means for recovery
From our politi-unacceptable claim,
And stealthily project LVT once again.
If we would but examine some more of the tree
Alternatives are waiting there for us to see.
Among them is hiding a far better way
For an equivalent LVT effect, to stay
In essence, without causing such evil offences
To the landlords and their partitioning fences.
When a property-owner decides to sell–quick
The gov’ment buys its land, and not the public!
Its occupant then leases it for a similar fee
To the One-Tax of Henry George’s decree.
Any buildings on-site should be sold as previously
But without the land, on which the price grievously
Had risen, with huge speculation in its advance
That stopped entrepreneurs from having a chance.
The cost of this land must be raised through new bonds
Which the government sells and the public responds,
‘Though their interest-rate’s a bit lower than rent,
Their returns are more stable than the average tenant!
This process will take many years to complete–
So its financial support is no great money feat.
After the lease-fees begin to collect,
Gov’ments can tax less, and firmly expect
To pursue this policy without change, until
All the lease-fees are site-rents in the Gov’ment’s till.
With the land properly shared, the government sees
That site development stays with the current leasees.
Other taxes that cause so much trouble and hate
Are scrapped, with great pleasure to all in the state,
Except for some bankers and the tax collectors
Whose actions no longer apply in these sectors.
Land-rights will be shared through this simple device,
By a fast-growing country that takes our advice.